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Philosophy and Theology

Scholarly defenses of abortion continue to be produced, and so defenders of the
right to live of all human beings, born and unborn, are never in want of a subject. In
his article “A Present Like Ours,” Michael Davis’s challenges are not only to Don
Marquis’s future-like-ours critique of abortion but also to abortion critiques from
the (new and classic) natural law perspective based on the person as an individual
substance of rational nature.1 Davis writes, “Marquis’s theory treats the rights of
adult women as counting no more than those of a fetus no more complicated than an
ameba. Even many people who oppose abortion will recognize that as discriminating
against women.” 2
In fact, the pro-life view does not treat the rights of adult women as counting no
more than those of a fetus no more complicated than an amoeba. Women (and men)
have numerous rights, both legally and morally, that are not enjoyed by a prenatal
human being. They can drive, vote, run for public office, and within the parameters
of the law and sound ethics, govern their own lives in ways that no minor child may.
The pro-life view is not that women and unborn human beings have equal rights in
every respect, but that all human beings, born and unborn, male and female, mature
and immature, share in the same basic rights, including the right to life. To treat all
human beings as fundamentally equal in basic dignity is to avoid unjust discrimination by acknowledging that all women, all children, and all men are created equal
and endowed with basic rights. Indeed, it is discrimination to treat some human
beings—those who are not like us in terms of race, religion, or birth—as lacking
basic rights. So it is not defenders of prenatal human beings but defenders of abortion
who are acting to reinforce discrimination.
1. Michael Davis, “A Present Like Ours: A Refutation of Marquis’s Argument against
Abortion and a Sketch of a General Theory of Personhood,” International Journal of Applied
Philosophy 27.1 (Spring 2013): 88, doi: 10.5840/ijap20132718.
2. Ibid.
© 2016 The National Catholic Bioethics Center
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But the claim that all human beings have equal rights itself causes other problems
on Davis’s view:
There are few, if any, places in the world today, or at any other time, where the
criminal law would treat as a murderer the woman who deliberately obtained
an early abortion. Even where abortion has been prohibited, the law has generally treated the fetus, even a relatively mature fetus, as something less than
“one of us.” Marquis’s theory proves more than it should. Marquis owes us an
explanation of why abortion, even early in pregnancy, is not simple murder,
deserving death or at least long imprisonment; or, if Marquis actually thinks
it is murder, he should say so openly, accepting that as a conclusion against
common sense.3

What Davis is saying is that if pro-life advocates really believe that a prental human
being has a right to life, then they should advocate for laws that make abortion not
just a crime but a crime equal to first-degree murder.
If all human beings share in equal basic rights, does it follow that abortion
must be treated by criminal law as first-degree murder? Should women who get
abortions get the death penalty, be imprisoned for life, or at least be subjected to the
same punishment as other people who intentionally kill innocent human beings? Is
Marquis, and are other defenders of the equal rights of prenatal human beings, fundamentally inconsistent in not making this demand? Or are pro-life people lacking
in forthrightness because they think women who get abortions should be treated as
murderers, but they lack the courage to state this publically?
Inconsistency or timidity are not the only alternatives. To defend the basic
equal rights of all human beings does not necessarily mean that abortion should be
punished as first-degree murder. Abortion and the murder of an adult are alike in that
both involve the intentional killing of an innocent person. But there are important
differences between an abortion and a typical case of murder. The first difference
has to do with culpability in terms of knowledge and in terms of voluntariness. If I
kill my auto mechanic, it is implausible in the extreme for me to try to excuse my act
by claiming that I did not realize that he was an innocent human being. By contrast,
in many (maybe even most) cases of abortion, the woman obtaining the abortion
does not believe that her authorization is terminating the life of an innocent human
being. It could be that this ignorance is culpable or that this ignorance is inculpable,
but ignorance of the identity of the victim is almost never involved in typical cases
of murder.
Secondly, the voluntariness of the act is often mitigated by great fear or anxiety
on the part of the woman. When mothers kill their own newborns, as sometimes
happens, it is not unusual for the punishment due for killing an innocent person to
be mitigated in light of subjective factors that led to the killing, such as postpartum
depression. By similar reasoning, mothers who authorize an abortion are often motivated by intense fear, which reduces the voluntariness of the act. In many cases of
abortion, again unlike typical cases of murder, duress is involved, in which the father

3. Ibid.
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of the child, and sometimes others, pressure the woman into getting an abortion that
she would have never gotten had the news of the pregnancy been greeted with joy.
Third, the victim of abortion—although fundamentally equal—is not equal in
all respects to the victim in a typical murder. In a typical murder, the victim’s death
negatively affects the victim’s relatives and friends. The victim can no longer carry
out his or her responsibilities at work or at home. The killing involved in murder
may also make other people fear for their lives. The typical murder also brings a
loss for all those who contributed to the life of the one who is killed—such as the
parents, caregivers, and teachers who helped the victim gain maturity. Finally, the
typical murder thwarts the life-plans of the victim, whose dreams, ambitions, and
plans are demolished by death.
These characteristics, typical of a case of murder, are not present in an abortion. A prenatal human being does not have friends, and relatives may not even know
of his or her existence. Human beings who find out about someone else’s abortion
do not fear for their own lives, since abortions kill only prenatal human beings. An
unborn child does not have responsibilities at work or home on which others depend.
Only one person—the pregnant woman—has contributed to the maturation of the
fetus, and this is the person who is authorizing the abortion. Moreover, the prenatal
human being does not yet have plans, ambitions, and dreams that are thwarted by
getting killed. So although the killing involved in abortion and the killing involved
in a typical murder are the same in the most important fundamental sense—an
innocent person’s life is extinguished—in many other ways, they are not the same.
It makes sense, therefore, for the law to take these many differences into account
when determining the punishment appropriate for abortion and appropriate for typical
murder. These differences also answer the question of why it makes sense to rescue
one five-year-old girl rather than ten frozen human embryos.
By similar reasoning, the assassination of the president of the United States
should be treated more severely by law than the murder of a regular citizen, in virtue
of the president’s role in society and the fact that the president’s death adversely affects
not just immediate family members and friends but potentially the entire world. So,
too, the murder of a regular person should be treated more severely by law than the
intentional killing of a human being prior to birth. Yet making such differentiations
is consistent with holding that, in terms of basic human dignity, the president, the
regular citizen, and the human fetus have equal basic rights. It is not inconsistent for
a defender of prenatal human beings to advocate lesser penalties for abortion than
for the murder of postnatal human beings.
Moreover, prudential considerations of the enforceability of the law suggest that
the penalties for violating laws forbidding abortion should fall on abortionists rather
than on women getting abortions. Mitigating factors typically reduce the culpability
of women seeking abortions. Abortionists ending the lives of prenatal human beings
typically perform their tasks as part of a regular routine, without mitigating factors.
If women were also subject to criminal penalties, it would make the prosecution of
abortions much more difficult, since women would be implicating themselves in
criminal activity by testifying against the abortionists. Moreover, abortionists typically kill many prenatal human beings, whereas an individual woman rarely has as
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many abortions. With laws against illegal drugs, the law should focus on the drug
dealers who profit from endangering others rather than on the drug users who often
suffer from their use. Similarly, laws against abortion should focus on abortionists
who profit from killing rather than women who often suffer from abortions.
In another critique, Robert Lovering’s “The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2)”
casts the pro-life view as resting on “the basic potential for rational moral agency”
of the prenatal human being.4 But the pro-life view in its standard articulations by
Robert George, Francis Beckwith, Patrick Lee, and many others including myself
does not rest on the claim that every human being prior to birth has the basic potential for rational moral agency, but rather that every human being (born and unborn)
actually (not just potentially) possesses a rational nature.5 What is the difference?
A basic potential for rational agency may not be present in some human beings,
such as those who have a serious mental handicap. Yet such human beings deserve
fundamental protection against exploitation and against being intentionally killed.
Having misrepresented the pro-life position, Lovering then points out that “it’s
very difficult to see how this unactualizable potential could confer moral standing.
For all practical purposes, there is no difference between possessing this unactualizable potential and not possessing it at all. Given this, it’s very difficult to see how
there could be a moral difference between possessing this unactualizable potential
and not possessing it at all.” 6 The difficulty only arises because the rational nature
of a being is confused with its potential for rational agency.
But perhaps this response only pushes the dispute to a different level. Why
should we say that a particular being has a rational nature, if in fact this being has
no potential to perform rational activities? This question might be clarified in the
course of considering another objection to the substance view.
Lovering notes that if we hold that human beings prior to birth have a basic
potential for rational moral agency because most or many of them will develop to
the point where they possess either proximate or immediately exercisable rational
agency, then a problem arises. Because an estimated 60 percent of pregnancies end
in spontaneous miscarriage, only 40 percent of prenatal human beings will ever
exercise rational agency. If we hold that 40 percent or even a much lower percentage
of successful development of rational agency is sufficient for granting moral status
to the entire group, then we are acting arbitrarily and moving closer to the view that
rational agency is relevant.7
4. Rob Lovering, “The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2),” Bioethics 28.7 (September 2014): 378.
5. See, for example, Christopher Kaczor, The Ethics of Abortion: Human Life, Women’s
Rights, and the Question of Justice, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015); Francis Beckwith,
Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense
of Human Life, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Witherspoon Institute, 2011); and Patrick Lee, Abortion
and Unborn Human Life (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).
6. Lovering, “Substance View (2),” 381, original emphasis.
7. Ibid.
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Even assuming the highly debatable claim that 60 percent of pregnancies
spontaneously miscarry, this argument is problematic. To examine this objection,
let’s consider what it is to be a mammal. Part of what distinguishes mammals is
their ability to nurse their young. So human beings, dogs, and zebras are mammals;
iguanas, tapeworms, and wasps are not mammals. Not so fast, replies the critic. Do
you not realize that some human beings, dogs, and zebras do not nurse their young,
even cannot nurse their young? Male mammals of all these species cannot nurse
their young, females before puberty cannot nurse their young, and elderly females
cannot nurse their young. There are even cases of females of reproductive age who
cannot nurse their young. The percentage of human beings, dogs, and zebras who
are capable of nursing their young is, therefore, well below 40 percent. So are we
mistaken in claiming that all human beings are mammals?
Of course not. In fact, all human beings, dogs, and zebras are mammals, not just
females of those species and not just females of reproductive age, because all these
creatures belongs to the kind of species that nurses its young. So, too, there is nothing
arbitrary about including prenatal human beings in the category of rational animals.
In his Scholastic Metaphysics (required reading for anyone interested in the
intersection of classic Thomistic metaphysics and analytic philosophy), Edward Feser
clarifies what is at issue: “The distinction between essence and properties makes sense
of the distinction between normal and defective instances. . . . Given its essence, a cat
has four legs, but this property might not manifest itself in a particular cat if the cat
is genetically or otherwise damaged. . . . Its lack of four legs just makes it a defective
cat, and precisely because four-leggedness is one of its properties.” 8 Feser goes on
to point out that all human beings are rational animals, even if some human beings
because of genetic malfunction, brain injury, or immaturity do not engage in rational activity. Indeed, we identify this human being as immature, or brain damaged,
or genetically malformed because we have already properly categorized them as a
rational animal. The defect points to the non-defective; immaturity is understood by
reference to maturity.
Now consider another objection to the substance view offered by Lovering.
Imagine that scientists discover a rational agency serum that can boost the intelligence of chimpanzees so they are like the apes in Planet of the Apes. These chimps
would clearly be persons with rights to live. “Now, clearly, the ultimate potential for
rational moral agency in their case would be an accidental property,” writes Lovering,
who concludes that therefore, “it’s not the case, then, that an entity’s moral standing must be a function of its essential properties.” 9 An entity’s moral standing, as in
the case of these apes, can rest on accidental properties.
This objection rests on the assertion that the apes in the sci-fi example have
acquired their standing as rational agents because of an accidental quality. There is an
alternative explanation of the case. That some apes were injected with the rationality

8. Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (NeunkirchenSeelscheid, Germany: Editiones Scholasticae, 2015), 233.
9. Lovering, “Substance View (2),” 383, original emphasis.
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serum may be accidental in some senses. For example, maybe, much like penicillin,
the rational agency serum was found by accident rather than a deliberate plan to create
rational agents. The property in question could also be accidental in that these apes
rather than other apes were injected. Perhaps the scientists injected whichever apes
happened to be on one side of the cage, or perhaps they injected a particular ape if a
flipped quarter landed heads but not if it landed tails. The apes may be have an accidental property in these senses, but in another sense the property in question cannot
be accidental. The rationality serum causes not an accidental but rather a substantial
change in the ape. The ape, in virtue of gaining radically new abilities, becomes a
radically different kind of creature with a radically different moral status. Just as an
injection that kills an ape brings about substantial change in the ape from living to
deceased, so too the rational agency serum brings about a substantial change in the
ape from being a nonrational agent to a rational agent.
Lovering also raises a dilemma against the substance view. Do dolphins, apes,
and whales have intrinsic value or extrinsic value? He writes, “By ‘intrinsic’ value I
mean value it’s logically possible for something to have even if it were the only thing
that existed.” 10 So intrinsic value is a value that it’s logically possible for something to
have even if it is the only thing that exists. If there were only one person, that person
would have intrinsic value. But if there were only one toothbrush, that toothbrush
would not have intrinsic value, and it would only gain extrinsic value because people
like to have clean teeth. Intrinsic value does not come in degree: a being either has
it or does not have it. Extrinsic value, again by contrast, may come in degrees (the
toothbrush is more or less useful). If intrinsic value does not come in degrees, then
dolphins, apes, whales, and other intelligent animals either have moral status just
like us (which advocates of the substance view reject) or have no intrinsic value at
all (which is counter-intuitive, “given their similarities to beings with the ultimate
potential for rational moral agency”).11 On the other hand, if such creatures are to
have only extrinsic value, then they have the same moral status as tools, which also
seems counter-intuitive because almost everyone condemns animal cruelty.
If nonrational animals do not have equal moral status with human beings, does
it follow that they are mere tools with which human agents can do anything they
please? This conclusion does not follow. Let’s say that someone legally obtained
Michelangelo’s Pieta and decided to destroy it for no good reason. Is this action
ethically problematic? Yes, you might say, because it deprives innumerable people
of the chance to see this beautiful sculpture. So let’s say the owner of the Pieta was
the last man in the world: could he destroy it then for no good reason? The Pieta
is, after all, a mere piece of marble and so lacks intrinsic value. True, but the man
who destroyed it would be acting badly in as much as it is against reason to destroy
something of spectacular beauty without sufficient reason. A reasonable response
to a thing of beauty is to contemplate and cherish it, not destroy it. Acting against
reason, as St. Thomas Aquinas argues, is ethically wrong.12
10. Ibid., 378 note 2.
11. Ibid., 384.
12. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II.94.3 ad 2.
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On the other hand, if the man had to break apart the Pieta to make a barricade
so that wild animals wouldn’t eat him, he would be justified in destroying the statue.
In a similar way, a reasonable response to suffering is to alleviate it. Just as beauty
is something in general to be contemplated, suffering is something in general to
be avoided. It is unreasonable to inflict pain on a sentient being without sufficient
justification. To delight in inflicting pain is irrational. So unless a person has a sufficient justification for inflicting pain on an animal, an agent is unjustified in doing
so. Animal cruelty is therefore wrong, but we don’t need to assume that animals
have rights (any more than statues have rights) in order to come to this judgment.13
These recent attempts to justify abortion provide no sound reason to abandon
the principle that all human beings, including those waiting to be born, should be
welcomed in life and protected by law.
C hr istopher K aczor

13. Germain Grisez offers other reasons against animal cruelty that do not presuppose
that animals have moral status; see The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 2, Living a Christian Life,
ch. 10, question C, http://www.twotlj.org/G-2-10-C.html.
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